Move orders in contests: Equilibria and winning chances

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gao, Lei; Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Zhewei
• 署名单位: Shandong University; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.003
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 436-468
• 关键词: Tullock contests; Simultaneous contests; Strong-lead/weak-lead sequential contests; Non-preemptive equilibria; Preemptive equilibria; Winning chances

摘要

This paper studies general two-player sequential-move competitions, accommodating a full spectrum of Tullock contest technology and contestants' asymmetry. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a preemptive equilibrium to prevail in both strong-lead and weak-lead contests, and discover a characteristic equation to pin down the players' effort ratio (which fully determines their winning chances) and their effort levels when a non-preemptive equilibrium prevails. We find that while the strong player always has a higher winning chance when moving first, simultaneous moves sometimes maximize the weak player's winning odds. We further allow the move orders endogenous through winning-odd-maximizing coaches' independent choices.