Obvious manipulations in matching with and without contracts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Risma, Eliana Pepa
• 署名单位: Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Universidad Nacional de San Luis
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.02.013
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 70-81
• 关键词: Obvious manipulations; matching; CONTRACTS; mechanism design

摘要

This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism -which is either stable or individually rational and Paretodominates (from the doctors' perspective) a stable mechanism-, is susceptible to manipulation by doctors. Our study focuses on obvious manipulations and identifies stable-dominating mechanisms that prevent them. Without contracts, we show that any stable-dominating mechanism is not obviously manipulable. However, with contracts, none of these results hold. While we demonstrate that the Doctor-Proposing Deferred Acceptance (DA) Mechanism remains not obviously manipulable, we show that the Hospital-Proposing DA Mechanism and any efficient mechanism that Pareto-dominates the Doctor-Proposing DA Mechanism become (very) obviously manipulable, in the model with contracts.