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作者：MIRMAN, LJ; SAMUELSON, L; SCHLEE, EE
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies a duopoly market in which firms can draw inferences concerning (uncertain) market demand from observations of their outputs and market price. Firms may adjust their outputs away from myopically optimal levels to affect the informativeness of the market price. Because firms' quantities are observed, firms can manipulate the extent to which belief revision occurs rather than the direction in which beliefs are revised (as in signal-jamming models). We develop conditions and pre...
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作者：BOARD, R
摘要：This paper explores the conditions under which agents can learn enough about an economy to form rational expectations. The agents' rationality is bounded by limiting their computational resources to algorithms with running time bounded by a polynomial in the relevant problem parameters. We characterize the classes of price functions and economies that agents can learn under these assumptions and present a result that suggests that it is unlikely that agents can learn even those price functions...
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作者：MOYES, P
摘要：This paper analyzes the redistributive effect of transformations of incomes when the same transformation is applied to all incomes. Following Marshall and Olkin (''Inequalities: A Theory of Majorization and its Applications,'' Academic Press, New York, 1979), we consider two competing families of nested inequality criteria, all of which are consistent with the Lorenz ordering. Looking at the transformations that reduce the inequality of incomes, we show that, within each family, all the criter...
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作者：MAKOWSKI, L; MEZZETTI, C
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We investigate the possibility of designing efficient mechanisms that are consistent with voluntary participation. We present two main results. First, we characterize the class of Bayesian mechanisms that are ex post efficient, interim individually rational, and ex post budget balancing. Second, we characterize the class of dominant strategy mechanisms that are ex post efficient and ex post individually rational, but only ex ante budget balancing. Both our characterizations have simple and int...
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作者：TIAN, GQ
摘要：In this paper we investigate incentive aspects of the Linear Cost Share Equilibrium principle by designing mechanisms whose Nash allocations coincide with Linear Cost Share equilibrium allocations. The mechanisms presented here allow not only preferences but also initial indowments to be privately observed, a feature missing from much recent work in implementation theory. We give mechanisms for both cases of withholding and destruction of endowments. If one reinterprets the commodity space, ou...
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作者：DAVIES, J; HOY, M
作者单位：University of Guelph; University of Southampton
摘要：Third-degree stochastic dominance (TSD) has been promoted as a normative criterion to refine the partial ordering over income distributions induced by second-degree stochastic dominance (i.e., the Lorenz criterion). This paper enhances our understanding of the normative properties of TSD. By defining a ''Rawlsian composite transfer'' to be a progressive transfer combined with a regressive transfer, with the former taking place in a lower income region, we show how TSD is a ''Rawlsian extension...
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作者：DETEMPLE, J; MURTHY, S
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Newark
摘要：We examine the behaviour of the interest rate, asset prices, and asset holdings in an economy with heterogeneous, rationally updated beliefs about the expected rate of production growth. The equilibrium interest rate is a weighted average of the interest rates that would prevail in economies populated by homogeneous agents with the beliefs of the respective agents in the heterogeneous model. The weights are given by the fractions of total wealth held. Financial innovation affects the dynamics ...
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作者：BORDER, KC; SEGAL, U
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：Machina has proposed a definition of dynamic consistency which admits non-expected utility functionals. We show that even under this new definition a dynamically consistent preference relation that is differentiable becomes arbitrarily close to an expected utility preference after the realization of a low probability event. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：LAMBSON, VE
摘要：Optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames exhibit security level punishments for the largest firm. If no firm has sufficient capacity to service the market, then collusion that is barely sustainable by optimal penal codes entails higher capacity utilization by the largest firm than by the other firms. Collusion supported by optimal penal codes in models with a large firm facing a competitive fringe can result in the large firm having low capacity utilization and thus providing a ''...
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作者：SCHMEIDLER, D; TAUMAN, Y
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：This work was motivated by a problem regarding a group of public utilities located in relatively close proximity to each other. Some of these utilities are confronted by a shortage of capacity while others have excess capacity. The buyers cooperate to purchase in the most efficient way the quantities they need (which are private information). The total joint cost is then allocated by an incentive compatible rule (i.e., a rule which induces the buyers to reveal their true demands). We show that...
