INCENTIVE-COMPATIBLE COST-ALLOCATION SCHEMES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
SCHMEIDLER, D; TAUMAN, Y
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1039
发表日期：
1994
页码：
189-207
关键词：
摘要：
This work was motivated by a problem regarding a group of public utilities located in relatively close proximity to each other. Some of these utilities are confronted by a shortage of capacity while others have excess capacity. The buyers cooperate to purchase in the most efficient way the quantities they need (which are private information). The total joint cost is then allocated by an incentive compatible rule (i.e., a rule which induces the buyers to reveal their true demands). We show that for a large class of problems there are cost-allocation schemes which are incentive compatible and yield individually rational and efficient outcomes. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.