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作者：MIRMAN, LJ; SAMUELSON, L; SCHLEE, EE
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：This paper studies a duopoly market in which firms can draw inferences concerning (uncertain) market demand from observations of their outputs and market price. Firms may adjust their outputs away from myopically optimal levels to affect the informativeness of the market price. Because firms' quantities are observed, firms can manipulate the extent to which belief revision occurs rather than the direction in which beliefs are revised (as in signal-jamming models). We develop conditions and pre...
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作者：BOARD, R
摘要：This paper explores the conditions under which agents can learn enough about an economy to form rational expectations. The agents' rationality is bounded by limiting their computational resources to algorithms with running time bounded by a polynomial in the relevant problem parameters. We characterize the classes of price functions and economies that agents can learn under these assumptions and present a result that suggests that it is unlikely that agents can learn even those price functions...
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作者：BENHABIB, J; PERLI, R
摘要：In this paper we study the dynamics of endogenous growth, both in the model of Lucas and in a generalization that incorporates a labor-leisure choice. We characterize the regions of the parameter space that give rise to unique equilibria as well as the regions that yield a continuum of equilibria with positive growth rates. We find that such multiple equilibria exist for empirically very plausible parameters, in particular when the Lucas model is modified to incorporate endogenous labor. Journ...
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作者：GALI, J
摘要：We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with monopolistically competitive firms and endogenous markups and show the possibility of equilibria with persistent fluctuations driven by self-fulfilling revisions of expectations. For some parameter values such fluctuations are characterized by time series properties similar to those observed in U.S. postwar business cycles. In contrast with the existing literature our results do not rely on the presence of increasing returns or nominal rigidi...
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作者：MOYES, P
摘要：This paper analyzes the redistributive effect of transformations of incomes when the same transformation is applied to all incomes. Following Marshall and Olkin (''Inequalities: A Theory of Majorization and its Applications,'' Academic Press, New York, 1979), we consider two competing families of nested inequality criteria, all of which are consistent with the Lorenz ordering. Looking at the transformations that reduce the inequality of incomes, we show that, within each family, all the criter...
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作者：CHAE, S; YANG, JA
摘要：We propose an n-person pure bargaining game which generalizes Rubinstein's two-person bargaining game, and show that there exists a unique perfect equilibrium outcome. The solution approaches the n-person Nash solution, as defined by Chae [''The n-person Nash bargaining solution with time preference,'' Econ. Lett. 41 (1993), 21-24] in the time preference framework, as the time lapse between bargaining rounds goes to 0. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：GOTTARDI, P
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：In this paper we show that if markets are incomplete and there are nominal assets, whose payoff is denominated in money, monetary policy will be in general non-neutral. The mechanism through which monetary policy operates is a change in the structure of the rates of return: by changing the level of money prices monetary policy affects the payoffs of nominal assets. This differs from previous arguments for non-neutrality. We also show that a consideration of this effect of monetary policy may a...
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作者：PERRY, M
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作者：SAMUELSON, L
摘要：We investigate an evolutionary process that is continually perturbed by ''mutations.'' If the support of the (unique) stochastically stable distribution is a singleton, then it must be a Nash equilibrium. If one element of a ''mutation-connected component'' of Nash equilibria appears in the stochastically stable distribution, then all members of that component appear. This implies that the stochastically stable distribution will include weakly dominated strategies in many cases, and in some ca...
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作者：MAKOWSKI, L; MEZZETTI, C
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We investigate the possibility of designing efficient mechanisms that are consistent with voluntary participation. We present two main results. First, we characterize the class of Bayesian mechanisms that are ex post efficient, interim individually rational, and ex post budget balancing. Second, we characterize the class of dominant strategy mechanisms that are ex post efficient and ex post individually rational, but only ex ante budget balancing. Both our characterizations have simple and int...
