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作者：QUIGGIN, J; WAKKER, P
作者单位：Australian National University; Leiden University; Leiden University - Excl LUMC
摘要：Quiggin (J. Econ. Behav. Organization 3 (1982), 323-345) introduced anticipated (''rank-dependent'') utility theory into decision making under risk. Questions have been raised about mathematical aspects of Quiggin's analysis. This paper settles these questions and shows that a minor modification of Quiggin's axioms leads to a useful and correct result, with features not found in other recent axiomatizations. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：FOLEY, DK
摘要：A market consists of agents defined by finite offer sets of acceptable transactions. When there are many agents with each offer set, statistical equilibrium is the feasible distribution of agents over offer sets that can be realized in the largest number of ways. A unique statistical equilibrium exists if there is a feasible market transaction and generically is a Gibbsian canonical distribution: the number of agents achieving each transaction is inversely proportional to the exponential of it...
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作者：DUFFY, J
摘要：This paper examines disequilibrium adaptive learning behavior in an overlapping generations model with fiat money. Agents are concerned with forming correct forecasts of future inflation. If they use a disequilibrium, adaptive forecast rule, it is shown that they will eventually learn to believe in a nonstationary, nonunique perfect foresight equilibrium. The nonstationary equilibrium isolated by the adaptive learning process can be used to explain the sluggish adjustment of the price level to...
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作者：RABIN, M
摘要：A model is presented where players communicate prior to the play of a two-player, complete-information game. Each of two common hypotheses is examined: That communication yields Nash-equilibrium outcomes, and that, within the equilibrium framework, communication yields Pareto-efficient equilibria. The strong version of each of these hypotheses is rejected but weaker results are established. The main result is that, if we assume equilibrium and that players communicate for a long time, then in ...
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作者：GLAZER, J
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：When rival firms issue long-term debt, their product market behavior is driven by strategic considerations that would not be present if the firms had no debt or if their debt was short term. It is shown that with limited liability, a firm's behavior in product market competition can be strongly affected by its accumulated profits. In markets where firms choose output in every period, the higher is the firm's profit in a given period, the less aggressive it will be in the subsequent periods. Th...
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作者：MAILATH, GJ; SAMUELSON, L; SWINKELS, JM
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Northwestern University
摘要：Normal form information sets capture situations in which players can make certain decisions as if they knew their opponents had chosen from a particular subset of their strategies. In this paper, we say that an extensive form game represents a normal form game if, for each such situation, the corresponding choice in the extensive form is made with the player knowing that the opponents have chosen from the relevant subset. We develop an algorithm that generates a representation whenever one exi...
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作者：CHEW, SH; KARNI, E
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：In this paper we establish the equivalence of act-independence and commutativity and the equivalence of comonotonic act-independence and comonotonic commutativity under mild conditions. As a result, using a theorem of Nakamura, we obtain an axiomatization of subjective expected utility and Choquet expected utility with a finite state space based on act-independence and comonotonic act-independence, respectively.
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作者：MORENO, D; WALKER, M
摘要：We show that Ljung's projection algorithms, which have recently been used by economists to establish convergence to rational expectations equilibrium, do not seem to apply to learning or forecasting behavior that one would normally call ''decentralized.'' If the algorithm is defined in a way that allows individuals to have differing information, then Ljung's theorem does not apply. And even if a similar theorem could be proved that would allow for differing information, there remains a Lyapuno...
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作者：LUENBERGER, DG
摘要：This paper presents two, mutually dual, optimization principles, termed the zero-maximum principle and the zero-minimum principle, respectively, that characterize economic equilibria. The first of these principles states an equivalence between equilibrium allocations and allocations that maximize total societal benefit and make that benefit zero. The second principle states an equivalence between equilibrium price vectors and price vectors that minimize the total economic surplus and make that...
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作者：DIAMANTARAS, D; WILKIE, S
作者单位：Telcordia Technologies
摘要：We introduce an extension of Kaneko's ratio equilibrium to the case of economies with many public and private goods. Specifically, we employ a general production model where public goods may be inputs in the production of public goods. Using the accounting concept of transfer prices, we propose a definition of ratio equilibrium that generalizes Kaneko's. We prove that, under standard assumptions, ratio equilibria exist and are free-access core allocations and therefore Pareto efficient.
