BAYESIAN AND WEAKLY ROBUST FIRST BEST MECHANISMS - CHARACTERIZATIONS
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
MAKOWSKI, L; MEZZETTI, C
署名单位：
University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1079
发表日期：
1994
页码：
500-519
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate the possibility of designing efficient mechanisms that are consistent with voluntary participation. We present two main results. First, we characterize the class of Bayesian mechanisms that are ex post efficient, interim individually rational, and ex post budget balancing. Second, we characterize the class of dominant strategy mechanisms that are ex post efficient and ex post individually rational, but only ex ante budget balancing. Both our characterizations have simple and intuitive interpretations. The designer can implement a first best outcome if and only if the sum of the non-distortionary charges she can impose on agents covers the deficit created by giving each agent the total gains from trade. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
来源URL：