SOME RESULTS ON OPTIMAL PENAL CODES IN ASYMMETRIC BERTRAND SUPERGAMES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
LAMBSON, VE
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1025
发表日期：
1994
页码：
444-468
关键词：
摘要：
Optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames exhibit security level punishments for the largest firm. If no firm has sufficient capacity to service the market, then collusion that is barely sustainable by optimal penal codes entails higher capacity utilization by the largest firm than by the other firms. Collusion supported by optimal penal codes in models with a large firm facing a competitive fringe can result in the large firm having low capacity utilization and thus providing a ''price umbrella'' for the fringe firms, which have high capacity utilization.