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作者：ESTEBAN, J; MITRA, T; RAY, D
作者单位：Cornell University; Boston University
摘要：This paper is concerned with the characterization of public debt policies that are consistent with competitive equilibria in which (i)money is positively priced, and (ii)intertemporal allocation is efficient. The framework used is an overlapping generations model with many goods, agents with two-period lifetimes, and nonstationary tax-transfer policies. We show, under some regularity conditions on such policies that the size of the public debt not growing ''too fast'' is both necessary and suf...
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作者：RIVARD, BA
摘要：This paper constructs a simple overlapping generations model with money and production in an environment of monopolistically competitive firms and an increasing returns to scale production technology. Within this framework symmetric stationary sunspot equilibria are generated without requiring the assumption of gross complementarity between future consumption and current leisure. Output fluctuations may also be highly persistent in this model.
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作者：SHIGOKA, T
摘要：We show how to construct stationary sunspot equilibria in a continuous time model, where equilibrium is indeterminate near either a steady state or a closed orbit. Woodford's conjecture that the indeterminacy of equilibrium implies the existence of stationary sunspot equilibria remains valid in a continuous time model. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：THOMSON, W
摘要：We consider the problem of fairly allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences. We search for methods of performing this division, or solutions, that satisfy the following property of consistency: any recommendation made for any economy is in agreement with the recommendation made for any ''reduced'' economy obtained by imagining the departure of some of the agents with their allotted consumptions. Our main result is that essentially all efficient su...
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作者：BALDER, EJ; RUSTICHINI, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Balder (Math. Oper. Res. 13 (1988), 265-276) gave an existence result for a Nash equilibrium in a game with incomplete information. This game had finitely many players. Here it is shown that his analysis can be extended to deal with infinitely many players.
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作者：DOW, J; WERLANG, SRD
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We define Nash equilibrium for two-person normal-form games in the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Using the formalization of Schmeidler and Gilboa, we show that Nash equilibrium exists for any degree of uncertainty aversion, that maximin behaviour can occur even when it is not rationalizable in the usual sense, and that backward induction breaks down in the twice repeated prisoners' dilemma. We relate these results to the literature on cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemm...
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作者：GOENKA, A
摘要：This paper studies the effect of different rationing or income supplement schemes on equilibrium outcomes. Specifically, the question is whether the rationing schemes are successful in neutralizing extrinsic uncertainty, i.e., are stable against sunspots. Under direct, quantify rationing the equilibria are not affected by sunspots. Under value rationing, where the value spent on a group of commodities is restricted through the use of coupons, the equilibria can be affected by self-fulfilling b...
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作者：PARENTE, SL
摘要：We develop a model in which firms choose which technologies to adopt as well as the timing of such adoptions. In between adoptions, a firm accumulates expertise in its technology which allows it to operate the technology more efficiently. Thus, there is firm-specific learning-by-doing. For certain parameterizations of the model and appropriate initial distributions of technologies and expertise, equilibria are characterized by positive and constant growth of per capita output and positive but ...
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作者：BENPORATH, E; GILBOA, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatization of linear inequality measures representing binary relations on the subspace of income profiles having identical total income. Interpreting the binary relation as a policymaker's preference, we extend the axioms to the whole space and find that they characterize linear social evaluation functions. The axiomatization seems to suggest that a policymaker who has a linear measure of inequality on a subspace should have a linear evaluation on the whole space. An...
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作者：ARAUJO, A; MONTEIRO, PK
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
摘要：This paper deals with the existence of equilibria with infinitely many goods. Its main goal is to show that when restricted to the set of feasible allocations there exists an economically meaningful price (in the sense that a price in L1 is economically meaningful but a purely finitely additive measure is not). We cover both the L(p) (1 less-than-or-equal-to p less-than-or-equal-to infinity) and M(K) cases. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
