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作者：MANDLER, M
摘要：A sequential regularity concept is proposed for intertemporal general equilibrium models: in addition to the intertemporal economy, the economies that endogenously arise through time should also be regular. With linear activities, however, there are open sets of economies that are sequentially indeterminate: economies with a continuum of equilibria appear. Endowments in a measure-zero set are necessary for indeterminacy, but the passage of time allows these endowments to arise robustly. The in...
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作者：FLEURBAEY, M
摘要：A model of fair division in which differential claims are grounded in talents and handicaps is studied, and a characterization of three solutions is provided. The first two solutions, conditional equality and egalitarian-equivalence, display dual properties. The consistency axiom is shown to have strong consequences in one-good models. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：KAMIYA, K
摘要：In contrast to general equilibrium models with convex technologies, marginal cost pricing equilibria are not necessarily Pareto optimal in general equilibrium models with increasing returns to scale (or nonconvex) technologies. In this paper, we consider an economy with several consumers, several convex firms, and several natural monopolies with nonconvex technologies. The purpose of this paper is to show that if the natural monopolies are regulated to follow a certain nonlinear pricing rule, ...
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作者：NAGARAJAN, S
摘要：This paper extends the mechanism design technique to financial assets and examines the welfare implications of popular linkages between shareholdings and control in takeovers. When all contenders for control except the incumbent have private information, plurality mechanisms are generically efficient, but simple majority rules are not with more than two contenders. When all contenders have private information, plurality, majority and winner-take-all mechanisms are not generically efficient. In...
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作者：OSANO, H
摘要：The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the standard results of classical general equilibrium theory still hold in private information economies where the possibility of renegotiation of initial contracts (lotteries) is allowed. We establish that competitive equilibria with contracts (lotteries) exist and are optimal for the class of private information economies in which principal-agent problems are characterized by moral hazard and renegotiation-proof contracts (lotteries). We also s...
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作者：Balasko, Y
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要：This paper proposes an elementary geometric proof or the are-connectedness of the set of regular economies with a unique equilibrium in the case of two agents and two goods. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Dow, J; Gorton, G
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We present a simple general equilibrium model of asset pricing in which profitable informed trading can occur without any ''noise'' added to the model. We use an equilibrium concept similar to rational expectations equilibrium, but which explicitly allows for the possibility of adverse selection. We show that models of profitable informed trading must restrict the portfolio choices of uninformed traders: in particular, they cannot buy the market portfolio. In this model, profitable informed tr...
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作者：MA, JP
摘要：Tn this paper we introduce the notion of a rematching-proof equilibrium for a two-sided matching market to resolve Roth's open question: What kind of equilibria of the game induced by any stable mechanism with respect to misreported profiles produce matchings that are stable with respect to the true profile. We show that the outcome of a rematching-proof equilibrium is stable with respect to the true profile, even though the equilibrium profile may contain misreported preferences. We also show...
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作者：PHELAN, C
摘要：This paper considers a repeated unobserved endowment economy with a restriction that agents can walk away from insurance contracts at the beginning of any period and contract with another insurer (one-sided commitment). An equilibrium is derived characterized by a unique, market-determined insurance contract with the properly that agents never want to walk away from it. The paper shows that trade (or insurance) still occurs and that a non-degenerate long-run distribution of consumption exists....
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作者：MATSUI, A; MATSUYAMA, K
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix (both symmetric and asymmetric) games with two strict Nash equilibria by embedding the static games in a dynamic random matching framework, played by a continuum of anonymous agents. Unlike in evolutionary games, the players are rational and maximize discounted payoffs, but they are restricted to make a short-run commitment when choosing actions. This dynamic game with frictions has stationary states, which correspond to the Nash equilibria o...
