RENEGOTIATION-PROOF LOTTERIES EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ECONOMY WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
OSANO, H
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1016
发表日期：
1995
页码：
435-467
关键词：
摘要：
The purpose of this paper is to explore whether the standard results of classical general equilibrium theory still hold in private information economies where the possibility of renegotiation of initial contracts (lotteries) is allowed. We establish that competitive equilibria with contracts (lotteries) exist and are optimal for the class of private information economies in which principal-agent problems are characterized by moral hazard and renegotiation-proof contracts (lotteries). We also show that financial intermediaries arise endogenously in this environment: financial intermediaries are part of an efficient arrangement which is needed to support the competitive equilibrium allocations of our private information economy. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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