REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND ONE-SIDED COMMITMENT
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
PHELAN, C
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1050
发表日期：
1995
页码：
488-506
关键词：
摘要：
This paper considers a repeated unobserved endowment economy with a restriction that agents can walk away from insurance contracts at the beginning of any period and contract with another insurer (one-sided commitment). An equilibrium is derived characterized by a unique, market-determined insurance contract with the properly that agents never want to walk away from it. The paper shows that trade (or insurance) still occurs and that a non-degenerate long-run distribution of consumption exists. A numerical example shows that this distribution is nearly log-normal. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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