ON THE GENERIC EFFICIENCY OF TAKEOVERS UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
NAGARAJAN, S
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1019
发表日期：
1995
页码：
522-556
关键词：
摘要：
This paper extends the mechanism design technique to financial assets and examines the welfare implications of popular linkages between shareholdings and control in takeovers. When all contenders for control except the incumbent have private information, plurality mechanisms are generically efficient, but simple majority rules are not with more than two contenders. When all contenders have private information, plurality, majority and winner-take-all mechanisms are not generically efficient. In fact, generic efficiency is impossible if the winner obtains non-zero shares. The results suggest that common linkages between shares and control may be incompatible with generic efficiency under incomplete information. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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