AN APPROACH TO EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MATSUI, A; MATSUYAMA, K
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1015
发表日期：
1995
页码：
415-434
关键词：
摘要：
We consider equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix (both symmetric and asymmetric) games with two strict Nash equilibria by embedding the static games in a dynamic random matching framework, played by a continuum of anonymous agents. Unlike in evolutionary games, the players are rational and maximize discounted payoffs, but they are restricted to make a short-run commitment when choosing actions. This dynamic game with frictions has stationary states, which correspond to the Nash equilibria of the static game. Our selection is based on differential stability properties of the stationary states. It is shown that, for a small degree of friction, a strict Nash equilibrium becomes uniquely absorbing (and globally accessible) if and only if it is risk-dominant (Harsanyi and Selten, ''A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games,'' MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988). (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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