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作者：BLUME, A; SOBEL, J
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets of good and bad equilibria. The good equilibria are those that cannot be destabilized by another good equilibrium. The remaining equilibria are bad. An equilibrium for the original game is communication proof if its is a good equili...
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作者：ARYA, A; GLOVER, J
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper studies a multiagent moral hazard setting. We resolve the tacit collusion problem that arises in our setting while employing a solution concept that makes less demanding behavioral assumptions than Nash. A simple mechanism is constructed that approximately implements the second-best solution in two rounds of iteratively removing strictly dominated strategies. Under our mechanism, the agents' best-reply correspondences are well defined, a small message space is employed, and the mess...
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作者：Hellwig, MF
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：The paper gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an expected-utility-maximizing decision maker to prefer any compound Sigma(i)(n)=1 <(X)over tilde(i)> of n independent, identically distributed random variables over any other such compound Sigma(i)(n)=1 <(Y)over tilde(i)> with E<(Y)over tilde(i)> < E<(X)over tilde(i)>, provided that n is sufficiently large. A sufficient condition is that absolute risk aversion go to zero as the decision maker's wealth becomes unboundedly positive or nega...
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作者：Serizawa, S
摘要：We study the preference domain where voting by committees of Barbera et nl. (S. Barbera, H. Sonnenschein, and L. Zhou, Voting by committees, Econometrica 59 (1991), 595-609) is strategy-proof in an extended model. ''Cross-shaped'' preference is a generalization of separable preference of Barbera et al. We show that if a scheme of voting by committees without a dummy voter is strategy-proof on some rich domain, then any preference of a voter is cross-shaped on some set. The width of such set de...
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作者：TENRAA, T
摘要：The substitution theorem states that an economy with many commodities but only one factor input (say labor) will net substitute inputs (commodities or labor) when final demand changes. This Note drops the assumption that all activities require some labor input and constructs the dominant technology. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：ESTEBAN, J; MITRA, T; RAY, D
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作者：GOLLIER, C
摘要：In this paper, we consider the problem of determining the conditions under which a change in risk increases the optimal value of a decision variable for all risk-averse agents. For a large class of payoff functions, we obtain the least constraining (necessary and sufficient) condition on the change in risk for signing its effect without any additional restriction on the utility function than risk aversion. It entails all existing sufficient conditions as particular cases. Our results are appli...
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作者：GOVINDAN, S
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：For the Kreps and Wilson version of Selten's Chain Store Game, every equilibrium of every stable set induces the same outcome. This unique outcome is that induced by the Kreps and Wilson solution. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：LAGUNOFF, RD
摘要：In decision problems where agents hold private information, an uninformed central planner may be unable to identify Pareto improvements that each agent himself could identify. We examine allocation rules in a simple bilateral bargaining problem which are ''resilient'' in the sense that no improvements could be both identified and collectively achieved when the traders themselves can bargain over the mechanism. Specifically, recursively resilient rules are status quo, sequential equilibrium out...
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作者：KANDORI, M; ROB, R
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We extend the evolutionary process studied in Kandori er al., Econometrica 61 (1993), 29-56, to n x n games. The evolutionary process is driven by two forces: players switching to the best response against the present strategy configuration, and players experimenting with new strategies. We show that a unique behavior pattern, called the long-run equilibrium, arises even if the underlying game has multiple (static) equilibria. The paper gives a general algorithm for computing the LRE, and then...
