STABLE MATCHINGS AND REMATCHING-PROOF EQUILIBRIA IN A 2-SIDED MATCHING MARKET
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MA, JP
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1045
发表日期：
1995
页码：
352-369
关键词：
摘要：
Tn this paper we introduce the notion of a rematching-proof equilibrium for a two-sided matching market to resolve Roth's open question: What kind of equilibria of the game induced by any stable mechanism with respect to misreported profiles produce matchings that are stable with respect to the true profile. We show that the outcome of a rematching-proof equilibrium is stable with respect to the true profile, even though the equilibrium profile may contain misreported preferences. We also show that a rematching-proof equilibrium exists. Moreover, the Nash equilibria in Roth (J. Econ. Theory 34 (1984), 383-387) are shown to be rematching-proof equilibria. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
来源URL：