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作者：Jehiel, P
摘要：In two-player infinite-horizon alternating-move games, a limited forecast(n(1),n(2))-equilibrium is such that (1) player i chooses actions according to his n(1)-length forecasts so as to maximize the average payoff over the forthcoming n(i) periods, and (2) players' equilibrium forecasts are correct. With finite action spaces, (n(1),n(2)-)solutions always exist and are cyclical, and the memory capacity of the players has no influence on the set of solutions. A solution is hyperstable if it is ...
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作者：Padilla, AJ
摘要：The degree of collusiveness of a market with consumer switching costs is analyzed in an infinite-horizon model of duopolistic competition. In contrast with previous analyses, we assume that firms compete for the demand for a homogeneous good by setting prices simultaneously in each period. This problem is formulated as a simple stochastic game, and a symmetric stationary Markovian perfect equilibrium with distinctive economic features is studied. We show that switching costs unambiguously rela...
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作者：Hong, CS; Hui, MM
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper extends Machina's (Econometrica 50 (1982), 277-323) characterization of risk aversion for Frechet differentiable non-expected utility preferences to the class of continuous non-expected utility preferences without imposing any differentiability requirement. The necessary and sufficient condition for risk aversion is derived in terms of the Schur concavity of the preference Functional when evaluated on finite lotteries with equal probabilities. The latter is characterized by its marg...
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作者：NEARY, HM; WINTER, RA
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：In the context of bilateral agency contracts in which the input of each agent cannot be contractually enforced, this paper asks, What determines the relative shares of the agents? The answer is simple and surprisingly general. The relative shares are given by the fourth root of the inverse ratio of the slopes of marginal products. This result is applied to several examples of bilateral agency contracts. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：SUEN, W
摘要：When the expected flow returns from an investment is positive, bancruptcy carries a cost in terms of the future profit opportunities forgone. This paper demonstrates that, under limited liability, the one-shot gain from taking risky projects is offset by the long-term loss resulting from a higher probability of bankruptcy. In a multi-period model, the incentive problems associated with limited liability is less severe than what static models would suggest. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：NEME, A; QUINTAS, L
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes the payoff vectors which are obtained by considering issues of perfection in the Rubinstein (A. Rubinstein, J. Econ. Theory 38 (1986), 83-96) (R) model. The paper concludes that there is little change in the set of payoff vectors but that the proposed equilibrium strategies are different from those suggested in R. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：KELSEY, D; MILNE, F
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：The arbitrage pricing theorem of finance shows that in certain circumstances the price of a financial asset may be written as a linear combination of the prices of certain market factors. This result is usually proved with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences. In this paper we show that the result is robust in the sense that it will remain true if certain kinds of non-expected utility preferences are used. We consider Machina preferences, the rank dependent model, and non-additive subjective pr...
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作者：Waehrer, K
摘要：This paper develops an auction model in which the winning bidder has an opportunity to cancel the transaction and pay damages to the seller. In the event of a default on the auction contract, the winning bidder pays liquidated damages or loses a posted deposit. When renegotiation is possible, increasing the deposit has no effect on the seller's payoff unless the seller has some bargaining power and exogenously receives some information about the winning bidder. Under these conditions the selle...
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作者：CHEN, KP
摘要：Van Damme (J. Econ. Theory 47 (1989), 206-217) shows that in the Green-Porter imperfect monitoring model the only weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRPE) is to play the stage game Cournot equilibrium at all stages. We first find a restriction that a WRPE will impose on the stage game actions. Then using this restriction we construct an example to show that van Damme's conclusion is not necessarily correct. We explain why van Damme's argument cannot apply. Finally, we show that despite th...
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作者：KANEDA, M
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：A dynamic model of international trade with a continuum of countries is presented. The terms of trade path each country takes as given are endogenous in the model. Countries differ by the rate of time preference and have populations of onverlapping generations of labor. Industrialization is modeled as the reallocation of labor to the sector with external increasing returns, the process of which is gradual due to a demographic constraint. In a perfect forseight equilibrium, countries with lower...
