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作者：BERNHEIM, BD; DASGUPTA, A
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We study a class of repeated games in which the discount factor falls asymptotically to zero through time (reflecting, for example, a vanishing probability of continuation). For an important class of stage games, we give a condition on the sequence of discount factors that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of nondegenerate equilibria. We also study the properties of the equilibrium set when this condition is satisfied. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：MA, JP
摘要：Tn this paper we introduce the notion of a rematching-proof equilibrium for a two-sided matching market to resolve Roth's open question: What kind of equilibria of the game induced by any stable mechanism with respect to misreported profiles produce matchings that are stable with respect to the true profile. We show that the outcome of a rematching-proof equilibrium is stable with respect to the true profile, even though the equilibrium profile may contain misreported preferences. We also show...
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作者：PHELAN, C
摘要：This paper considers a repeated unobserved endowment economy with a restriction that agents can walk away from insurance contracts at the beginning of any period and contract with another insurer (one-sided commitment). An equilibrium is derived characterized by a unique, market-determined insurance contract with the properly that agents never want to walk away from it. The paper shows that trade (or insurance) still occurs and that a non-degenerate long-run distribution of consumption exists....
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作者：KAHN, CM; MOOKHERJEE, D
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We extend the notion of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium to a class of matching games with private information. This solution concept is applied to an adverse selection insurance economy and is shown to yield a unique allocation: the optimal allocation without cross-subsidy. This contrasts sharply with the outcome in alternative institutional settings for negotiations among players, as modeled for instance by the Incentive Compatible Core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers ...
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作者：MATSUI, A; MATSUYAMA, K
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We consider equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 bimatrix (both symmetric and asymmetric) games with two strict Nash equilibria by embedding the static games in a dynamic random matching framework, played by a continuum of anonymous agents. Unlike in evolutionary games, the players are rational and maximize discounted payoffs, but they are restricted to make a short-run commitment when choosing actions. This dynamic game with frictions has stationary states, which correspond to the Nash equilibria o...
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作者：RAHI, R
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：This paper provides a simple parametric framework for comparing alternative incomplete asset structures in a productive economy, focusing on the role of assets in allocating risk and transmitting private information. It characterizes asset structures that are constrained efficient in the sense that no other asset structure, with the same number of securities, leads to a Pareto-dominating allocation in equilibrium. Specifically, a constrained efficient asset structure must be efficient with res...
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作者：LIPMAN, BL; SEPPI, DJ
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We study sequential message-sending games with an uninformed decision maker and multiple self-interested informed agents in which the ability to prove claims is limited. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of robust inference rules-that is, rules which lead to full, correct inferences even if the decision maker has very little information about speakers' preferences or strategies. Surprisingly little provability is needed when the decision maker only knows that the sp...
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作者：HARA, C
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：A general equilibrium model of endogenous asset formation is given in which a monopolistic agent, called the designer, can create any types of assets and charage commissions as long as the total number of the types of assets does not exceed some given constant. When the designer can create at most two assets, a commission-revenue maximizer always exists. Otherwise, it may not. Moreover, the so-called epsilon-maximizers may be badly behaved. A (profit) maximizer may not exist even when the numb...
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作者：DUTTA, PK; RUSTICHINI, A
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We study a class of two-player continuous time stochastic games in which agents can make (costly) discrete or discontinuous changes in the variables that affect their payoffs. It is shown that in these games there are Markov-perfect equilibria of the two-sided (s, S) rule type. In such equilibria at a critical low state (resp, high state), player 1 (resp. 2) effects a discrete change in the environment. In some of these equilibria either or both players may be passive. On account of the presen...
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作者：NANDEIBAM, S
摘要：This Note shows that regularity, which is weaker than rationalizability, can be used to prove the random dictatorship result of McLennan (A. McLennan, J. Econ. Theory 22 (1980), 1-11). The result in this Note also shows that in Pattanaik and Peleg (P. K. Pattanaik and B. Peleg, Econometrica 54 (1986), 909-921), when there are at least three alternatives in the universal set, the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition and the requirement that the number of alternatives in the univers...
