COALITION PROOF EQUILIBRIUM IN AN ADVERSE SELECTION INSURANCE ECONOMY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
KAHN, CM; MOOKHERJEE, D
署名单位：
Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1034
发表日期：
1995
页码：
113-138
关键词：
摘要：
We extend the notion of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium to a class of matching games with private information. This solution concept is applied to an adverse selection insurance economy and is shown to yield a unique allocation: the optimal allocation without cross-subsidy. This contrasts sharply with the outcome in alternative institutional settings for negotiations among players, as modeled for instance by the Incentive Compatible Core. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C71, C72, D82. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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