REPEATED GAMES WITH ASYMPTOTICALLY FINITE HORIZONS
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BERNHEIM, BD; DASGUPTA, A
署名单位：
Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1068
发表日期：
1995
页码：
129-152
关键词：
摘要：
We study a class of repeated games in which the discount factor falls asymptotically to zero through time (reflecting, for example, a vanishing probability of continuation). For an important class of stage games, we give a condition on the sequence of discount factors that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of nondegenerate equilibria. We also study the properties of the equilibrium set when this condition is satisfied. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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