COMMISSION-REVENUE MAXIMATION IN A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM-MODEL OF ASSET CREATION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
HARA, C
署名单位：
University of London; University College London
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1010
发表日期：
1995
页码：
258-298
关键词：
摘要：
A general equilibrium model of endogenous asset formation is given in which a monopolistic agent, called the designer, can create any types of assets and charage commissions as long as the total number of the types of assets does not exceed some given constant. When the designer can create at most two assets, a commission-revenue maximizer always exists. Otherwise, it may not. Moreover, the so-called epsilon-maximizers may be badly behaved. A (profit) maximizer may not exist even when the number of types of assets is endogenously determined from a positive fixed cost of creating an asset. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D80. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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