ROBUST INFERENCE IN COMMUNICATION GAMES WITH PARTIAL PROVABILITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
LIPMAN, BL; SEPPI, DJ
署名单位：
Carnegie Mellon University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1046
发表日期：
1995
页码：
370-405
关键词：
摘要：
We study sequential message-sending games with an uninformed decision maker and multiple self-interested informed agents in which the ability to prove claims is limited. We give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of robust inference rules-that is, rules which lead to full, correct inferences even if the decision maker has very little information about speakers' preferences or strategies. Surprisingly little provability is needed when the decision maker only knows that the speakers have conflicting preferences over his actions. Conflicting preferences guarantees that someone will have an incentive to ''correct'' any mistaken inference. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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