A NOTE ON RANDOMIZED SOCIAL CHOICE AND RANDOM DICTATORSHIPS
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
NANDEIBAM, S
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1056
发表日期：
1995
页码：
581-589
关键词：
摘要：
This Note shows that regularity, which is weaker than rationalizability, can be used to prove the random dictatorship result of McLennan (A. McLennan, J. Econ. Theory 22 (1980), 1-11). The result in this Note also shows that in Pattanaik and Peleg (P. K. Pattanaik and B. Peleg, Econometrica 54 (1986), 909-921), when there are at least three alternatives in the universal set, the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition and the requirement that the number of alternatives in the universal set exceed the number of individuals in the society by at least two can be jointly replaced by strategy proofness to obtain an alternative characterization of random dictatorships. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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