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作者：Bertoletti, P; Poletti, C
作者单位：University of London; Birkbeck University London; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：Martin models Cournot firms with informational asymmetries on costs to investigate the relation between X-inefficiency and the number of firms. He argues that an increase in the number of competitors decreases firm efficiency. We show that his results hold in a complete information model: they are due to the implicit assumption of increasing returns to scale. We further argue that a setting of adverse selection on cost and of ex post cost observability tends to isolate the intrafirm agency pro...
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作者：Landsberger, M; Meilijson, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We consider a principal-agent setting with two types of risk averse agents with different abilities to avoid losses. Abilities (types) are characterized by two distributions F and G which are agents' private information. All agents have the same increasing and strictly concave utility function U, under which G has a higher certainty equivalent. In this environment we derive a characterization of pairs of distributions under which a first best outcome can be achieved or approximated. We prove t...
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作者：LeBreton, M; Moyes, P; Trannoy, A
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Bordeaux; Universite de Bordeaux; CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：On the one hand, we know that, the more progressive a tax schedule, the more equally distributed the after tax incomes (U. Jakobsson, J. Public Econ. 5 (1976), 161-168). On the other hand, most tax systems involve a complex procedure where individual incomes are successively subjected to different rounds of taxation. We study in the paper the inequality reducing properties of the composition of different taxation schemes and we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for after tax inequal...
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作者：Kahn, JA; Landsburg, SE; Stockman, AC
摘要：Does an observation that is consistent with a theory constitute stronger evidence for that theory if it was made after the theory was proposed rather than before (when the observation might have influenced the theory's formation)? How and why might the research strategy of theorizing prior to observation affect the conditional probability that the theory is true? Is there a socially optimal set of research strategies and on what does it depend? In a world of asymmetric information, what incent...
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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal
摘要：This paper formulates the principle of ordinal welfare egalitarianism in a general model of collective choice where both the feasibility constraints and the preferences may vary. An axiomatization of all choice rules satisfying this principle is presented. The key axiom is a solidarity property with respect to changes that may occur, possibly jointly, in the feasibility constraints and the preferences. Solidarity with respect to changes in the feasibility constraints and solidarity with respec...
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作者：Battigalli, P
摘要：This paper evaluates different refinements of subgame perfection, which rely on different restrictions on players' assessments, using a simple and intuitive independence property for conditional probability systems on the space of strategy profiles. This independence property is necessary for full consistency of assessments, and it is equivalent to full consistency in games with observable deviators. Furthermore, while every conditional system on the strategies satisfying the independence prop...
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作者：Hurkens, S
摘要：We investigate the consequences of allowing some players to send a costly message before a game is played. Since messages have no literal meaning, sending costly messages is also called ''burning money.'' We consider a setting with n players among which k have the possibility to burn money. We show that strategy profiles in sets that are dosed under rational behavior yield all players that have the possibility to burn, their preferred outcome. Moreover, in such equilibria no money is actually ...
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作者：Stegeman, M
摘要：Suppose that risk neutral agents have independently (and perhaps asymmetrically) distributed private valuations for an indivisible object. A mechanism assigns the object, but it is costly to send messages to the coordinator. In these circumstances, the second-price auction has an equilibrium that is classically ex ante efficient, given general opportunities to invest in information about or enhancements of own valuations. In contrast, the first-price sealed bid auction may have no efficient eq...
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作者：Battigalli, P; Veronesi, P
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We provide two axiomatic characterizations of a stochastic independence property for conditional probability systems, previously proposed by Hammond. One characterization relies on the theory of lexicographic expected utility due to L. Blume er nl. [Econometrica 59 (1991), 61-79]; the other relies on the theory of conditional expected utility maximization due to Myerson [''Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,'' Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991]. Journal of Economic Literature Classificat...
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作者：Krasucki, P
摘要：We analyze n agents communicating in order to reach consensus. We show how some conditions on the topology of the communication graph (the order in which individuals communicate) are sufficient lo guarantee consensus on the value of a function satisfying the ''sure-thing'' condition. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, C78. (C) 1996 Academic Press. Inc.
