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作者：Cressman, R
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：The dynamic evolutionary stability of mutual defection is proven for the repeated prisoner's dilemma game where payoffs are cumulative and the number of repetitions is known. This agrees with the classical result that the only Nash equilibrium outcome is to defect al all stages of this repeated game. Moreover, it is shown that, for any initial polymorphic population, the evolutionary dynamic converges to a unique Nash equilibrium strategy that depends on the original polymorphism. Both these r...
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作者：Monderer, D; Shapley, LS
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Queens University - Canada
摘要：An n-person game has identical interests if it is best response equivalent in mixed strategies to a game with identical payoff functions, It is proved that every such game has the fictitious play property. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Nandeibam, S
摘要：When the individuals in P. K. Pattanaik and B. Peleg [Econometrica 54 (1986), 909-921] are permitted to have weak preference orders, we show that: (i) as in their paper, there is a unique weight for each coalition; and (ii) for each feasible proper subset of the universal set and each preference profile, the society can be partitioned, so that the weight of each coalition in this partition gives the probability of choosing some alternative which is best in the feasible set for at least one ind...
