Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Hurkens, S
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0043
发表日期：
1996
页码：
186-197
关键词：
摘要：
We investigate the consequences of allowing some players to send a costly message before a game is played. Since messages have no literal meaning, sending costly messages is also called ''burning money.'' We consider a setting with n players among which k have the possibility to burn money. We show that strategy profiles in sets that are dosed under rational behavior yield all players that have the possibility to burn, their preferred outcome. Moreover, in such equilibria no money is actually burnt; the possibility alone suffices. For the special case with two players all results go through for persistent retracts as well. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.