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作者：Morris, S
摘要：Savage [L. Savage, ''The Foundations of Statistics,'' Wiley, New York, 1954] showed how properties of a decision maker's probabilistic beliefs can be deduced from primitive consistency axioms on preferences. This paper extends that approach and shows how logical properties of belief-which underlie economists' models of information and knowledge-can be related to properties of preferences. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Hayashi, F; Matsui, A
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We present an infinite horizon model with capital in which fiat money and barter are two competing means of payment. Fiat money has value because barter is limited by the extent of a double coincidence of wants. The pattern of exchange rally involves both money and barter. We find that the Chicago rule is sufficient for Pareto efficiency, while nominal interest smoothing is necessary. For a specific utility function we provide a complete characterization of the patterns of exchange and calcula...
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作者：Luo, YF; Yue, CY; Ting, C
摘要：A lexicographic weak ordering for preferences between subsets is defined for a weak signed order. The lexicographic ordering satisfies Fishburn's monotone extension relations and is determined by two extension axioms. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Dockner, EJ; Sorger, G
作者单位：University of Vienna
摘要：We consider a model in which two agents share access to the same stock of a productive asset and study the implications of non-cooperative consumption behavior over time. Under standard assumptions on the production function we construct infinitely many Nash equilibria, all of which consist of stationary Markovian strategies. These equilibria result in overconsumption so that the uniquely determined long-run asset stock is too low as compared to the cooperative solution. However, in the limit ...
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作者：Hart, S; Heifetz, A; Samet, D
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Universite Catholique Louvain; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We introduce a new knowledge operator called ''knowing whether.'' Knowing whether an event occurred means either knowing that it occurred or knowing that it did not occur. We demonstrate the following difference between ''knowing whether'' and ''knowing that.'' In a multiple agent model, a sequence of events generated by successively applying ''knowing that'' operators, or their negations, may be contradictory. But when ''knowing whether'' operators are used instead, the sequence is never cont...
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作者：Dagan, N
摘要：Thomson (Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 219-245) proved that the uniform rule of the fair division problem, where preferences are single-peaked, is the unique rule which is bilaterally consistent, continuous, Pareto optimal, and envy-free, in a setting of an infinite number of potential agents. We show that the uniqueness of the uniform rule is achieved without assuming continuity, even in a setting of a finit...
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作者：Boyd, JH
摘要：This paper proves the existence of a non-trivial stationary optimal path in a multisectoral capital accumulation model with recursive preferences. The reduced-form recursive preferences are represented by an aggregator funtion. I introduce a new form of delta-normality that is appropriate for use with recursive preferences. Under some mild conditions on the aggregator, non-trivial steady slates exist when the technology is bounded and delta-normal. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Cornelli, F
摘要：This paper studies the optimal selling procedures for a monopolist, when consumers valuations are unknown and there are fixed costs. The ruled costs introduce a positive externality among customers: each customer benefits from the presence of others who help cover the fixed costs. In this context it is optimal for the monopolist to make the probability of each individual being served contingent on the valuations of all the other consumers. The monopolist therefore sets a minimum price and then...
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作者：Celentani, M; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long-lived small players in which state variables affect players' payoffs. The large player's type is private information. We give conditions under which in every Nash equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the game. While our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal government ...
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作者：Suzuki, T
摘要：In a path-breaking paper [7], J. S. Chipman proposed a concept of increasing returns resulting from external effects between the production process of different firms. Romer [18] successfully applied this idea to an optimal growth model and observed that the optimal path could grow without bound in contrast to a standard growth model with a decreasing returns to scale technology. In this paper, we show that under very general assumptions, there exists a competitive equilibrium which could grow...
