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作者：Hong, CS; Herk, LF
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Columbia University; University of Warsaw
摘要：The class of mean-independent incremental risks defined with respect tfr an initial risk, or status quo, is shown tu coincide with the vector space of incremental risks generated from risks that are individually independent of the status quo. Using this characterization of mean independence, aversion toward independent risk increases, together with diversification preference for mean-independent risk increases, implies aversion toward mean-independent risk increases. By contrast, a nondiversif...
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作者：Canoy, M
作者单位：KU Leuven; University of Amsterdam
摘要：In a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with homogeneous goods an equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist. Non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not solely due to the homogeneous goods assumption. In this paper I consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with product differentiation and I parametrize when an equilibrium exists. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D4, L1. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Kuhn, HW; Harsanyi, JC; Selten, R; Weibull, JW; vanDamme, E; Nash, JF; Hammerstein, P
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Bonn; Stockholm University; Tilburg University; Max Planck Society
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作者：Gresik, TA
摘要：Consider a two-party bargaining problem in which each party has private value information. This paper derives a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a strictly increasing equilibrium of a game in which bargaining takes place via a sealed-bid mechanism to be interim incentive efficient. In addition, this paper describes conditions under which an interim incentive efficient allocation can be realized via an equilibrium of a sealed-bid bargaining game that is also ex post individually r...
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作者：Qin, CZ
摘要：I consider a cooperation-formation game in which players choose independently with whom they wish to cooperate in a given coalitional game, and players' payoffs follow a solution imposed on the coalitional game. I study the resulting equilibrium cooperation structure and how cooperation evolves under best-response and fictitious-play learning processes. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Duggan, J; LeBreton, M
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：We prove the existence and uniqueness of the weak saddle, a solution due to Shapley, for a class of zero-sum games including tournament games, as defined by Laffond, Laslier, and Le Breton. We then show that the minimal covering set of a tournament, proposed by Dutta, coincides with the weak saddle of the corresponding tournament game. This provides a positive foundation for the minimal covering set and yields, as corollaries, Dutta's existence and uniqueness theorems for the minimal covering ...
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作者：Dutta, B; Sen, A
摘要：The paper demonstrates the formal similarity between the problem of ranking opportunity sets and an Arrovian aggregation problem. This parallel is exploited to axiomatize several rules for ranking opportunity sets. The standard Framework is also extended to allow for considerations of the diversity of available choices. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Gensemer, S; Hong, L; Kelly, JS
摘要：Fair division rules are examined in a framework consisting of local environments with fixed, non-disposable, perfectly divisible endowments, and (possibly) different division rules. Individuals have single-peaked preferences and are free to choose the environments where they live. Given that tile rules satisfy various desirable properties such as efficiency, strategy-proofness, or envy-freeness, the extent to which individuals have incentives to migrate to other environments is explored. (C) 1...
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作者：Jackson, MO; Wolinsky, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks, when self-interested individuals can form or sever links. First, for two stylized models, we characterize the stable and efficient networks. There does not always exist a stable network that is efficient. Next, we show that this tension persists generally: to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient, one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production. We charac...
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作者：Alcalde, J
摘要：This note analyzes the possibility of implementing stable outcomes for marriage markets. Our first result shows a contradiction between the use of stable mechanisms and the hypothesis of agents' behavior considered in the Nash equilibrium concept. We analyze the possibility of implementing two sets of stable allocations. by employing two types of mechanisms. The first mechanism is a ''now-or-never'' choice process that permits us to implement in undominated Nash equilibria the set of all the s...
