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作者：Hernandez, A; Santos, MS
摘要：In this paper we consider a sequential trading economy with incomplete financial markers and a finite number of infinitely lived agents. We propose a specification of agents' budget sets and show that such specification features several desirable properties. We then establish the existence of an equilibrium for a regular class of economies. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Gul, F; Pearce, DG
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：We show that ii the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of a stage game is convexified by the introduction of public random variables, then forward induction loses all its power as an argument for refining Nash equilibrium. We establish that our argument does not depend on a convenient choice of off-equilibrium path beliefs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Kolpin, V
摘要：Previous literature has shown that the serial cost sharing rule is endowed with a variety of desirable incentive and equity features. By definition, applications of this mechanism are essentially constrained to single service facilities. We investigate difficulties that emerge when attempting to extend serial cost sharing to multi-product environments. In particular, we show that such an extension is incompatible with the additivity axiom. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Einy, E; Holzman, R; Monderer, D; Shitovitz, B
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Haifa; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; McGill University
摘要：It is shown that the core of a non-atomic glove-market game which is defined as the minimum of finitely many non-atomic probability measures is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. This result is used to characterize some stable sets of large games which have a decreasing returns to scale property. We also study exact non-atomic glove-market games. In particular we show that in a glove-market game which consists of the minimum of finitely many mutually singular non-atomic measures, the core i...
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作者：Sasaki, H; Toda, M
作者单位：Tokyo Keizai University
摘要：In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Muthoo, A
摘要：This paper studies a one-shot, simultaneous-move bargaining game. Each bargainer makes a partial commitment (a share of the unit size cake that she would like to get), which can later be revoked at some cost to the player. The payoffs are defined, in part, by the Nash bargaining solution, where the feasible utility set is affected by the players' partial commitments. Under certain assumptions on the two cost-of-revoking functions, we establish that the model has a unique Nash equilibrium. It i...
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作者：Ferreira, JL
摘要：This paper proposes an equilibrium concept for the classes of environments in which players can communicate with each other but cannot make binding agreements. The communication-proof equilibrium is intended to be regarded as an extension of both coalition- and renegotiation-proof equilibria. Conceptual foundations for this particular definition are discussed as it is confronted with other definitions in these environments. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Cooper, DJ
摘要：I examine a model of finite automata playing the repealed prisoners dilemma in an evolutionary setting, similar to that developed by Binmore and Samuelson. The only alteration made to the model is the use of finite costs of complexity, as opposed to lexicographic costs of complexity. The results of Binmore and Samuelson are not robust to this change. Using finite costs of complexity, a folk theorem result is proved in place of the uniqueness result of Binmore and Samuelson. (C) 1996 Academic P...
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作者：Pietra, T; Siconolfi, P
作者单位：Universita di Modena e Reggio Emilia; Columbia University
摘要：We consider two-period, pure exchange economies with uncertainty and complete or incomplete asset markets. Assets are nominal. If the number of agents and of period-zero commodities is large enough, there is a dense, residual set of economies (parametrized by utility functions) such that, for each pair of distinct financial equilibria, spot zero equilibrium prices are different. Agents, observing first-period equilibrium prices, can formulate exact forecasts on future equilibrium prices, notwi...
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作者：Girotto, B; Ortu, F
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：Given the information structure and the number of securities, we characterize the set of all price-dividend systems for which there exist a dynamic portfolio with strictly positive value through time, and a strictly positive probability Q such that, expressing prices and dividends in units of such portfolio, every gain process is a Q-martingale. We also weaken our characterization by showing that the existence of a trading strategy with strictly positive terminal payoffs only is generically su...
