Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cooper, DJ
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0015
发表日期：
1996
页码：
266-275
关键词：
摘要：
I examine a model of finite automata playing the repealed prisoners dilemma in an evolutionary setting, similar to that developed by Binmore and Samuelson. The only alteration made to the model is the use of finite costs of complexity, as opposed to lexicographic costs of complexity. The results of Binmore and Samuelson are not robust to this change. Using finite costs of complexity, a folk theorem result is proved in place of the uniqueness result of Binmore and Samuelson. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.