Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Einy, E; Holzman, R; Monderer, D; Shitovitz, B
署名单位：
Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Haifa; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; McGill University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0010
发表日期：
1996
页码：
200-211
关键词：
摘要：
It is shown that the core of a non-atomic glove-market game which is defined as the minimum of finitely many non-atomic probability measures is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. This result is used to characterize some stable sets of large games which have a decreasing returns to scale property. We also study exact non-atomic glove-market games. In particular we show that in a glove-market game which consists of the minimum of finitely many mutually singular non-atomic measures, the core is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set iff the game is exact. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.