Forward induction and public randomization
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gul, F; Pearce, DG
署名单位：
Yale University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0075
发表日期：
1996
页码：
43-64
关键词：
摘要：
We show that ii the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of a stage game is convexified by the introduction of public random variables, then forward induction loses all its power as an argument for refining Nash equilibrium. We establish that our argument does not depend on a convenient choice of off-equilibrium path beliefs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.