Two-sided matching problems with externalities
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Sasaki, H; Toda, M
署名单位：
Tokyo Keizai University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0077
发表日期：
1996
页码：
93-108
关键词：
摘要：
In this paper, we develop a model of two-sided matching markets with externalities. A new concept of stability of matchings is proposed and it is shown to be the unique one that ensures the general existence. Moreover, it is demonstrated that our stability does not contradict Pareto optimality. Some extensions of the model are also discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D62. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.