A strategic model of social and economic networks
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Jackson, MO; Wolinsky, A
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0108
发表日期：
1996
页码：
44-74
关键词：
摘要：
We study the stability and efficiency of social and economic networks, when self-interested individuals can form or sever links. First, for two stylized models, we characterize the stable and efficient networks. There does not always exist a stable network that is efficient. Next, we show that this tension persists generally: to assure that there exists a stable network that is efficient, one is forced to allocate resources to nodes that are not responsible for any of the production. We characterize one such allocation rule, the equal split rule, and another rule that arises naturally from bargaining of the players. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.