Division rules and migration equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gensemer, S; Hong, L; Kelly, JS
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0039
发表日期：
1996
页码：
104-116
关键词：
摘要：
Fair division rules are examined in a framework consisting of local environments with fixed, non-disposable, perfectly divisible endowments, and (possibly) different division rules. Individuals have single-peaked preferences and are free to choose the environments where they live. Given that tile rules satisfy various desirable properties such as efficiency, strategy-proofness, or envy-freeness, the extent to which individuals have incentives to migrate to other environments is explored. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.