The partnered core of a game without side payments
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Reny, PJ; Wooders, MH
署名单位：
University of Toronto
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0091
发表日期：
1996
页码：
298-311
关键词：
摘要：
A payoff for a game is partnered if it admits no asymmetric dependencies. We introduce the partnered core of a game without side payments and show that the partnered core of a balanced game is nonempty. The result is a strengthening of Scarfs Theorem on the nonemptiness of the core of a balanced game without side payments. In addition. it is shown that if there are at most a countable number of points in the partnered core of a game then at least one core point is minimally partnered, meaning that no player requires any other player in particular to obtain his part of the core payoff. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.