1996

最新文章

• Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence AI翻译
  作者：Volij, O
  摘要：Aumann and Brandenburger [Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180.] provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that thei...
• ''Knowing whether,'' ''knowing that,'' and the cardinality of state spaces AI翻译
  作者：Hart, S; Heifetz, A; Samet, D
  作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Universite Catholique Louvain; Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
  摘要：We introduce a new knowledge operator called ''knowing whether.'' Knowing whether an event occurred means either knowing that it occurred or knowing that it did not occur. We demonstrate the following difference between ''knowing whether'' and ''knowing that.'' In a multiple agent model, a sequence of events generated by successively applying ''knowing that'' operators, or their negations, may be contradictory. But when ''knowing whether'' operators are used instead, the sequence is never cont...
• A note on Thomson's characterizations of the uniform rule AI翻译
  作者：Dagan, N
  摘要：Thomson (Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked, J. Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 219-245) proved that the uniform rule of the fair division problem, where preferences are single-peaked, is the unique rule which is bilaterally consistent, continuous, Pareto optimal, and envy-free, in a setting of an infinite number of potential agents. We show that the uniqueness of the uniform rule is achieved without assuming continuity, even in a setting of a finit...
• Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty AI翻译
  作者：Lo, KC
  摘要：Existing equilibrium concepts for games make use of the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage [28] to represent players' preferences. Accordingly, each player's beliefs about the strategies played by opponents are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsbeg Paradox demonstrating that the beliefs of a decision maker may not be representable by a probability measure, this paper generalizes equilibrium concepts for normal form gam...
• The existence of steady states in multisector capital accumulation models with recursive preferences AI翻译
  作者：Boyd, JH
  摘要：This paper proves the existence of a non-trivial stationary optimal path in a multisectoral capital accumulation model with recursive preferences. The reduced-form recursive preferences are represented by an aggregator funtion. I introduce a new form of delta-normality that is appropriate for use with recursive preferences. Under some mild conditions on the aggregator, non-trivial steady slates exist when the technology is bounded and delta-normal. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Optimal selling procedures with fixed costs AI翻译
  作者：Cornelli, F
  摘要：This paper studies the optimal selling procedures for a monopolist, when consumers valuations are unknown and there are fixed costs. The ruled costs introduce a positive externality among customers: each customer benefits from the presence of others who help cover the fixed costs. In this context it is optimal for the monopolist to make the probability of each individual being served contingent on the valuations of all the other consumers. The monopolist therefore sets a minimum price and then...
• Reputation in dynamic games AI翻译
  作者：Celentani, M; Pesendorfer, W
  作者单位：Northwestern University
  摘要：We analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long-lived small players in which state variables affect players' payoffs. The large player's type is private information. We give conditions under which in every Nash equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the game. While our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal government ...
• Variance aversion implies mu-sigma(2)-criterion AI翻译
  作者：Loffler, A
  摘要：It is shown that if traded portfolios form a convex cone (of dimension greater than two) containing the riskless asset, strict variance aversion and strict monotonicity in the riskless asset imply the mu-sigma(2)-criterion. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Pareto optimality and optimistic stability in repeated extensive form games AI翻译
  作者：Tadelis, S
  摘要：This paper extends the applications of the theory of social situations. In particular, we investigate characteristics of optimistic stable standards of behavior (OSSBs) in repeated extensive form games. The OSSB is interesting for two reasons: First, it refines subgame perfect equilibrium, Second, it strongly relates to von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable sets, We characterize the nondiscriminating OSSB and derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique nondiscriminating OSSB-...
• Intertemporal general equilibrium model with external increasing returns AI翻译
  作者：Suzuki, T
  摘要：In a path-breaking paper [7], J. S. Chipman proposed a concept of increasing returns resulting from external effects between the production process of different firms. Romer [18] successfully applied this idea to an optimal growth model and observed that the optimal path could grow without bound in contrast to a standard growth model with a decreasing returns to scale technology. In this paper, we show that under very general assumptions, there exists a competitive equilibrium which could grow...