Rationalizable predatory pricing
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Roth, D
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0022
发表日期：
1996
页码：
380-396
关键词：
摘要：
This paper shows that predatory pricing is rationalizable and is in this sense rational even when there is no uncertainty regarding structural parameters such as cost or demand. Predatory pricing is modelled as a war of attrition. All strategy profiles-including all possible lengths of predatory battles-are rationalizable in the extensive form. Despite this, weak restrictions on beliefs combined with rationalizability have drastic implications for the play of the game. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.