Reputation in dynamic games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Celentani, M; Pesendorfer, W
署名单位：
Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0078
发表日期：
1996
页码：
109-132
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze reputation in a game between a large player and a continuum of long-lived small players in which state variables affect players' payoffs. The large player's type is private information. We give conditions under which in every Nash equilibrium a very patient large player will get almost the largest payoff consistent with the small players choosing a best response in a large finite truncation of the game. While our results apply to the time inconsistency problem of optimal government policy, we show that for the durable goods monopoly reputation may fail ro improve the monopolist's payoff. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73. (C) 1996 Academic Press. Inc.