Equilibrium in beliefs under uncertainty
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Lo, KC
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0129
发表日期：
1996
页码：
443-484
关键词：
摘要：
Existing equilibrium concepts for games make use of the subjective expected utility model axiomatized by Savage [28] to represent players' preferences. Accordingly, each player's beliefs about the strategies played by opponents are represented by a probability measure. Motivated by experimental findings such as the Ellsbeg Paradox demonstrating that the beliefs of a decision maker may not be representable by a probability measure, this paper generalizes equilibrium concepts for normal form games to allow for the beliefs of each player to be representable by a closed and convex set of probability measures. The implications of this generalization for strategy choices and welfare of players are studied. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.