Epistemic conditions for equilibrium in beliefs without independence
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Volij, O
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0095
发表日期：
1996
页码：
391-406
关键词：
摘要：
Aumann and Brandenburger [Econometrica 63 (1995), 1161-1180.] provide sufficient conditions on the knowledge of the players in a game for their beliefs to constitute a Nash equilibrium. They assume, among other things, mutual knowledge of rationality. By rationality of a player, it is meant that the action chosen by him maximizes his expected utility, given his beliefs. There is, however, no need to restrict the notion of rationality to expected utility maximization. This paper shows that their result can be generalized to the case where players' preferences over uncertain outcomes belong to a large class of non-expected utility preferences. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.