Pareto optimality and optimistic stability in repeated extensive form games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Tadelis, S
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0064
发表日期：
1996
页码：
470-489
关键词：
摘要：
This paper extends the applications of the theory of social situations. In particular, we investigate characteristics of optimistic stable standards of behavior (OSSBs) in repeated extensive form games. The OSSB is interesting for two reasons: First, it refines subgame perfect equilibrium, Second, it strongly relates to von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable sets, We characterize the nondiscriminating OSSB and derive a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique nondiscriminating OSSB-a condition that is independent of the discount factor, delta. Our main result shows that the nondiscriminating OSSB selects Pareto optimal subgame perfect equilibrium paths in a class of repealed games, (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.