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作者：Xie, DY
摘要：Stackelberg differential games are useful settings in which optimal government policies can be studied. This paper argues that the analysis of these games involves a key technical issue. In particular, we question the necessity for optimality of one boundary condition invoked in existing literature. The issue is of key interest because the boundary condition is largely responsible for the time inconsistency results previously obtained. We show that the boundary condition is not necessary in so...
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作者：Fisher, EO
摘要：This note shows that there are monetary equilibria in the model of overlapping generations that are in the core. Some equilibria have positive stocks of outside money in every generation. These equilibria are thus self-enforcing, and introducing money into an economy need not be tantamount to contriving a new social institution designed to enforce sequential contracts. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：McKelvey, RD; Palfrey, TR
摘要：We investigate an infinite horizon two-person simultaneous move bargaining game with incomplete information and discounted payoffs. The game takes the form of a concession game: in each period, each player chooses to give in or hold out. The game continues until at least one of the players chooses to give in, at which point agreement has been reached and the game terminates. For any discount factor, if the players' priors about each other's type are sufficiently asymmetric, there is a unique N...
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作者：Sekiguchi, T
摘要：This paper analyzes repeated games with private monitoring, where in each period each player receives a signal of the other player's action in the previous period, and that signal is private information. Previous literature on discounted repeated games with private monitoring has not shown whether or not (nearly) efficient equilibria exist For a repeated prisoner's dilemma satisfying a certain assumption regarding stage game payoffs, we show that there exists a nearly efficient sequential equi...
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作者：Bag, PK
摘要：I examine a standard public goods provision problem and show that a simple adaptation of the Jackson-Moulin mechanism (J. Econ. Theory 57 (1992), 125-140) to divisible public goods achieves the socially efficient outcome and implements a family of cost-sharing rules in undominated Nash equilibria of a two-stage game, when agents' benefits from public good consumption are linear. Agents know their own marginal benefits and at least two agents with positive marginal benefits know the aggregate m...
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作者：Boyd, JH; Smith, BD
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We consider a two country growth model with international capital markets. These markets fund capital investment in both countries, and operate subject to a costly state verification (CSV) problem. Investors in each country require some external finance, but also provide internal finance, which mitigates the CSV problem. When two identical (except for their initial capital stocks) economies are closed, they necessarily converge monotonically to the same steady state output level. Unrestricted ...
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作者：Fershtman, C; Rubinstein, A
作者单位：Tilburg University; Princeton University
摘要：The paper presents a simple game-theoretic model in which players decide on search procedures For a prize located in one of a set of labeled boxes. The prize is awarded to the player who Finds it first. A player can decide on the number of (costly) search units he employs and on the order in which he conducts the search. It is shown that in equilibrium, the players employ an equal number of search units and conduct a completely random search. The paper demonstrates that the search procedure is...
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作者：Gilles, RP; Scotchmer, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We show that ''exhaustion of blocking opportunities'' is a sufficient condition such that every allocation in the core of a replicated club economy can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium, and that a related condition ''efficient scale'' is necessary and - under an assumption on endowments - sufficient such that competitive equilibrium exists and the core is nonempty. These results do not require the Euclidean structure and monotonicity assumed in Lindahl equilibrium, do not require ...
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作者：Dutta, B; Mutuswami, S
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：A network is a graph where the nodes represent agents and an are exists between two nodes if the corresponding agents interact bilaterally. An exogeneous value function gives the value of each network, while an allocation rule describes how the value is distributed amongst the agents. M. Jackson and A. Wolinsky (1996, J. Econ. Theory 71, 44-74) have recently demonstrated a potential conflict between stability and efficiency in this framework. In this paper, we use an implementation approach to...
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作者：Xue, LC
摘要：This article extends Chwe's (J. Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-325) nonemptiness result (Proposition 2) of the largest consistent set by relaxing both conditions of his proposition, including the countability of the set of alternatives. Such an extension enables the largest consistent set to be applied to models (e.g., the Cournot oligopoly model) with continuum of alternatives. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
