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作者：Ghirardato, P
摘要：An important technical question arising in economic and financial applications of decision models with non-additive beliefs is how to define stochastic independence. In fact the straightforward generalization of independence does not in general yield a unique product. I discuss the problem of independence, with specific focus on the validity of the Fubini theorem. The latter holds in general only for a special class of functions. It also requires a stronger notion of independent product. This ...
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作者：Miller, NH
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper examines deterministic partnerships where a single partner observes the actions taken by a subset of the other partners and issues a report conditional on that observation. No other partner has any additional information. In such a model, whenever the observing partner can see the action chosen by at least one other partner, the efficient action vector can be sustained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by sharing rule that exhibits budget balance and limited liability. (C) 1997 Acad...
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作者：Krebs, T
摘要：This paper combines statistical with economic equilibrium analysis in the context of one-step forward looking economic models. For a given state space, the economic analysis determines a set of Markov processes consistent with economic equilibrium, the set of expectational equilibria. The concept of statistical equilibrium rationalizes the introduction of a probability measure on the set of expectational equilibria. In the infinite observations limit, there exists a unique expectational equili...
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作者：Caplin, A; Nalebuff, B
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：Economic theory offers two different approaches to the analysis of group formation and the role of institutions. General equilibrium approach explores the influence of the economic environment on formation of coalitions. Game theory explores the influence of institutional rules on equilibrium outcomes. We introduce an integrative approach - an institution's policy depends on its membership, while its membership depends on the policies of all the institutions. We present three distinct mathemat...
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作者：Ok, EA
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I study the problem of ranking distributions of opportunity sets on the basis of equality. The analysis begins by developing alternative ways of formulating the notion of equalizing transfers in the context of opportunity distributions. It is readily observed that any such formulation must rely on agents' preferences over individual opportunity sets. and therefore. a theory of opportunity inequality measurement must be conditional upon the social opportunity set ranking one postulates. Unfortu...
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作者：Balasko, Y; Cres, H
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Majority voting aggregates individual preference profiles into a binary relation on the set of alternatives. Condorcet cycles are cycles of the aggregated binary relation. We show that the relative volume of the subset of the (n!-1)-simplex that represents profile distributions such that the aggregated preferences display Condorcet cycles is a decreasing Function of the super majority level tau bounded by the expression n!(1-tau/0.4714)(n!). This expression shows that Condorcet cycles become r...
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作者：Kohlberg, E; Reny, PJ
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Relative probabilities compare the likelihoods of any pair of events, even those with probability zero. Definitions of weak and strong independence of random variables on finite relative probability spaces are introduced. The former is defined directly, while the latter is defined in terms of approximations by ordinary probabilities. Our main result is a characterization of strong independence in terms of weak independence and exchangeability. This result is applied to game theory to obtain a ...
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作者：Benhabib, J; Rustichini, A
作者单位：New York University; Tilburg University
摘要：In the problem of optimal taxation in an economy with labor and capital, the optimal solution when the government can commit to a sequence of tax rates entails that the tax on capital tends to zero in the limit, with all the tax burden on labor. It is well known, however, that this solution is time inconsistent; so if the commitment power is not perfect, this second best tax plan will not be sustainable. We model explicitly the trade-off between the cost of revising the tax plan, and the benef...
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作者：Kim, T; Yannelis, NC
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：We prove the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for a Bayesian game with infinitely many players. We make three main advances to the existing literature. In particular: 1. We provide existence theorems where the set of agents can be an infinite set (countable or uncountable) as well as a measure space. 2. We use the information partition approach to model the differential information rather than the type set approach and therefore, our equilibrium is in behavioral strategies rather than ...
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作者：Gollier, C; Lindsey, J; Zeckhauser, RJ
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Harvard University
摘要：The hypothesis examined in this paper is that the greater the investor's flexibility, the easier it is for him to change his portfolio depending on his results, the more willing he will be to accept risks. When the investor has no control on the size of the risky investment, but can choose between one risky and one riskless asset, this conjecture is shown to be correct. However, if there is more than one risky asset each period, counterexamples demonstrate that flexibility rarely ensures great...
