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作者：Park, IU
摘要：This paper shows generic determinacy of equilibria for sender-receiver cheap-talk games: for a generic set of utilities on outcomes, there are a finite number of reduced form equilibria. A corollary is that generically the set of probability distributions over outcomes generated by equilibria is finite. Because of the identification of terminal nodes for utility purposes, Sard's theorem is not applicable in the way used in Kreps and Wilson [1], and a new proof strategy is developed. It is also...
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作者：Ohashi, K
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We study the optimal futures information in a dynamic economy and investigate how the results obtained in a static economy should be modified due to the possibility of dynamic trading. We analyze three different notions of ex ante optimality, depending on the authority's ability to redistribute wealth among the investors and characterize the optimal futures innovation in each sense. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Sung, J
摘要：We present an agency model to examine the use of corporate insurance by publicly held firms. We assume that insurance companies serve as investigators verifying whether or not accidents were insured. When the manager performs multiple tasks to reduce the expected number of accidents, the verification results can be used to produce a pair of managerial performance measures. We show that the optimal pair of performance measures tan be obtained when the corporate insurance policy covers all uncon...
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作者：Bona, JL; Santos, MS
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：This essay is concerned with computation as a tool for the analysis of mathematical models in economics, It is our contention that the use of high-performance computers is likely to play the substantial role in providing understanding of economic models that it does with regard to models in the physical and biological sciences. The main thrust of our commentary is that numerical simulations of mathematical models are in certain respects like experiments performed in a laboratory, and that this...
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作者：McLennan, A
摘要：For finite pure strategy sets S-1,...,S-n if E subset of S = S-1 x ... x S-n is the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for an open set of payoffs vectors, then #E less than or equal to #S/(max(i) #S-i). There is an open set of payoff vectors for which there are #S/(max(i) #S-i) pure Nash equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Forges, F; Minelli, E
作者单位：University of Brescia
摘要：We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria. Let E be an exchange economy with differential information. We associate a strategic market game Gamma(E) with E. We prove thai the allocations achieved through a self-fulfilling mechanism in Gamma(E) coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium allocations in E. In order to understand how self-fulfilment ...
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作者：Nyarko, Y
摘要：I study a model where hierarchies of beliefs (the beliefs about the beliefs of other agents, etc.) are important. I provide conditions under which optimal actions of agents will converge to the Nash equilibrium of the model characterized by the tree, previously unknown ''fundamentals.'' The conditions are (i) a contraction property on the best-response mappings and (ii) a mutual absolute continuity condition on beliefs. Violation of(i) may result in an ''anything is possible'' result: any stoc...
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作者：Boyd, JH; Conley, JP
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：D. Starrett [J. Econ. Theory 4(1972), 180-199] argues that the presence of externalities implies Fundamental nonconvexities which cause Arrow markets to fail. While this is true, we argue this failure is due to the structure of the Arrovian markets that Starrett uses, and not to the presence of externalities as such. We provide an extension of a general equilibrium public goods model in which properly rights are explicitly treated. Nonconvexities are not fundamental in this framework. We defin...
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作者：John, R
摘要：This note is a short comment on recent contributions by Peters and Wakker who extended classical examples in revealed preference theory by Gale and Shafer to the case of more than three commodities. It is shown that there is a much simpler proof of their results. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Laffond, G; Laslier, JF; LeBreton, M
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite; Aix-Marseille Universite; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：We prove that if all the off-diagonal entries of the payoff matrix of a finite symmetric two-player zero-sum game are odd integers then there exists a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
