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作者：Werner, J
摘要：Diversification is the strategy of investing small fractions of wealth in each of a large number of securities and thereby reducing risk. The basic argument in support of diversification is an appeal to the Law of Large Numbers. A portfolio in which an investor's wealth is invested in equal fractions in each of N securities with i.i.d. returns, has a return that converges to a riskless return as N increases indefinitely. Any risk averse investor would prefer the limit riskless return to the re...
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作者：Friedman, EJ; Johnson, S
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We analyze thr relationship between complementarities and monotonicity in dynamic programs. While complementarities (supermodularity and nondecreasing differences) are sufficient for monotonic statics ill stochastic dynamic programs: they an only ''robustly'' necessary in a limited may under heavy discounting, Monotonicity oi the: decision rule dues not in general imply monotonicity of the optimal path. In Fact, optimal paths in such models may exhibit extremely complex behavior. Fur convex ad...
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作者：Jones, LE; Manuelli, RE; Rossi, PE
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of Chicago
摘要：We show that in models in which labor services are supplied jointly with human capital, the Chamley and Judd result on zero capital income taxation in the limit extends to labor taxes as long as accumulation technologies are constant returns to scale. Moreover, for a class of widely used preferences, consumption taxes are zero in the limit as well. However, we show by the construction of two examples that these results no longer hold for certains types of restrictions on tax rates or if there ...
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作者：Ray, D; Vohra, R
作者单位：Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Brown University; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study equilibrium binding: agreements, the coalition structures that form under such agreements, and the efficiency of the outcomes that result. We analyze such agreements in a context where the payoff to each player depends on the actions of ail other players. Thus a game in strategic form is a natural starting point. Unlike the device of a characteristic Function, explicit attention is paid to the behavior of the complementary set of players when a coalition blocks a proposed agreement. A...
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作者：Konishi, H; LeBreton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：In this paper we show that a non-cooperative game with a finite set of players and common finite strategy sets possesses a strong Nash equilibrium in pure strategies whenever individuals' preferences satisfy independence of irrelevant choices, anonymity, and partial rivalry. Moreover, if any of these assumptions is violated, then even a pure strategy Nash equilibrium may fail to exist. Furthermore, we demonstrate that even with a continuum of players, the same three assumptions yield the exist...
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作者：Lambertini, L
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners' dilemma backward, From the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion. and where discount rates appear as the payoffs. Likewise, a prisoners dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Yosha, O
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：An economy with partially diversified imperfectly competitive (Cournot) intermediaries is replicated. The Cournot-Walras equilibrium converges to the perfectly competitive equilibrium with no uncertainty. Despite the convergence. the tension between diversification and competition persists when tho economy becomes large, and is manifested in the rates of convergence of price, quantities, and pel capita welfare to their respective limits. To maximize the rate of convergence of pei capita welfar...
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作者：Noldeke, G; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：In his work on signaling, Spence proposed a dynamic model of a market in which a buyer revises prices in light of experience and in which sellers. with private information about their types, choose utility-maximizing signals given these prices. We follow Spence's suggestion of introducing perturbations into the resulting dynamic process. In a broad class of markets, our model selects a separating equilibrium outcome if and only if the equilibrium outcome satisfies a version of the undefeated e...
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作者：Shin, SW; Suh, SC
作者单位：University of Windsor
摘要：We explore the possibility of constructing desirable game forms that doubly implement solutions in the commons problem. For thr desirability of a game form, we require that the game form satisfy several properties such as voluntary participation. quantity announcements, forthrightness, nonwastefulness, and best response property. Then we identify a class of solutions which are doubly implementable by such game forms. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：Khan, MA; Rath, KP; Sun, YN
作者单位：University of Notre Dame; National University of Singapore
摘要：We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in nonatomic games. We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of action sets cannot be relaxed, and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
