作者：AlNajjar, NI
摘要：The paper studies a contracting problem in which a principal enters in two-sided moral hazards with N independent agents. There are no technological or informational linkages among the N agency problems. Despite this independence, optimal incentive schemes essentially eliminate the principal's incentive problem when team size is large enough. Reputation-like effects appear in a static setting through an improved aggregation of information about the actions of the principal. One implication of ...
作者：Deb, R; Pattanaik, PK; Razzolini, L
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Mississippi
摘要：We consider Sen's familiar paradox of the Paretian liberal in a framework where individual rights are represented as a game form. We distinguish the different senses in which one can think of the problem of an inconsistency between the Pareto criterion and the existence of individual rights. Conditions, in terms of properties of the relevant game form, are given for such inconsistency to arise under different notions of game theoretic equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
