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作者：Baliga, S; Corchon, LC; Sjostrom, T
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Harvard University
摘要：In this paper we study a situation where the planner cannot commit to a mechanism and the outcome Function is substituted by the planner herself. We assume (i) agents have complete information and play simultaneously and (ii) given the messages announced by the agents, the planner reacts in an optimal way given her beliefs. This transforms the implementation problem into a signaling game. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for interactive implementation under different restrictions ...
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作者：Dutta, J; Morris, S
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：At a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE), individuals are assumed to know the map from states to prices. This hypothesis has two components, that agents agree (consensus) and that they have point expectations (degeneracy). We consider economies where agents' beliefs are described by a joint distribution on states and prices, and these beliefs are fulfilled at equilibrium. Beliefs are self-fulfilling if every price in the support of the distribution is an equilibrium price. The correspondin...
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作者：Benoit, JP
作者单位：New York University
摘要：We give a simple direct proof of Aumann and Maschler's result that the nucleolus is the contested-garment solution of a bankruptcy game. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
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作者：dAspremont, C; Ferreira, RD; GerardVaret, LA
作者单位：Universites de Strasbourg Etablissements Associes; Universite de Strasbourg
摘要：In a pure exchange economy we propose a general equilibrium concept under imperfect competition, the ''Cournotian Monopolistic Competition. Equilibrium,'' and compare it to the Cournot-Walras and the Monopolistic Competition concepts. The advantage of the proposed concept is to require less computational ability from the agents. The comparison is made first through a simple example, then through a mon abstract concept, the P-equilibrium, based on a general notion of price coordination. (C) 199...
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作者：Serrano, R
摘要：The reduced game relevant for the consistency of the prekernel is used to reinterpret this solution concept in a way that makes it independent of interpersonal utility comparisons. Based on this reinterpretation, a non-cooperative model is presented that yields in stationary equilibria the prekernel (kernel) for the class of monotonic transferable utility games. Next, we apply the same non-cooperative model to more general coalitional games. For pure bargaining problems, the model yields the N...
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作者：BenPorath, E; Gilboa, I; Schmeidler, D
作者单位：Northwestern University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：To take into account both es ante and es post inequality considerations, one has ro deal with inequality and uncertainty simultaneously. Under certainty, much of the literature has focused on ''comonotonically linear'' indices: functionals that are linear on cones or income profiles that agree on the social ranking of the individuals. This family generalizes both the Gini index and the egalitarian index (minimal income). However, it does not include functionals such as the average of expected-...
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作者：Russell, S
摘要：This paper describes a class of overlapging-generations economies that have ''quasifundamental'' (QF) equilibria-equilibria in which the price level and inflation rate are positively correlated with a ''fundamental'' random variable, despite the existence of an alternative, Pareto-dominant equilibrium in which the price level and/or inflation rate are constant. In QF equilibria the inflation rate is ''excessively variable'' using either quantitative or welfare-based variability measures. These...
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作者：Anderson, SP; Goeree, JK; Ramer, R
作者单位：University of Amsterdam
摘要：We analyze the canonical location-then-price duopoly game with general log concave consumer densities. A unique pure-strategy equilibrium to the two-stage game exists if the density is not ''too asymmetric'' and not ''too concave.'' These criteria are satisfied by many commonly used densities. Equilibrium locations are closer, and prices lower, the tighter the density. Our results apply also to a vertical differentiation specification. Symmetric densities that are ''too concave'' have no symme...
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作者：Battigalli, P
摘要：This paper analyzes Pearce's notion of extensive form rationalizability (EFR). Although EFR was originally defined as a reduction procedure, this paper shows that it can be characterized in terms of restrictions on players' updating systems. These restrictions correspond to a common hierarchy of nested hypotheses. Next the relationship of EFR to more familiar reduction procedures is examined. In generic games of perfect information, EFR is realization-equivalent to iterated weak dominance and ...
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作者：Segal, U
摘要：This note provides a positive answer to the following question. Is it possible to define a set of preference relations, one for each node of a decision tree, such that these preferences satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and dynamic consistency, and yet do not converge to expected utility? It is argued that updated preferences necessarily have one affine indifference curve but that other indifference curves are unrestricted. A connection is drawn to modelling ''reference points....
