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• On the convergence of beliefs within populations in games with learning AI翻译
  作者：Anthonisen, N
  摘要：The paper considers a fixed normal-form game played among populations of agents where the populations are uncountable. Each agent plays the game in each time period against members of the other populations with whom she is randomly matched. It is shown that the distributions of observations collected by each agent within a population are asymptotically identical. Therefore, if players use learning rules that possess certain basic features (referred to as ''consistency'' and ''exchangeability''...
• Multiplicity of equilibria AI翻译
  作者：Ghiglino, C; Tvede, M
  作者单位：Cornell University; University of Copenhagen
  摘要：A pure exchange, general equilibrium model is considered and the equilibrium set is studied. It is shown for all total endowments and an open and dense set of preferences that if there are l greater than or equal to 2 commodities and m greater than or equal to 2 consumers then there exists a set of distributions of endowments with nonempty interior such that the associated economies have at least l-1+min{l,m} equilibria For l+min{l,m} even and at least l-2+min{l,m} equilibria for l+min{L,m} od...
• Money, banking, and capital formation AI翻译
  作者：Schreft, SL; Smith, BD
  作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
  摘要：We consider a monetary growth model in which banks arise to provide liquidity. In addition, there is a government that issues not only money, but interest-bearing bonds; these bonds compete with capital in private portfolios. When the government fixes a constant growth rate for the money stock, we show that there can exist multiple nontrivial monetary steady states. One of these steady states is a saddle, while the other can be a sink. Moreover, paths approaching a steady state can display dam...
• Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets AI翻译
  作者：Sonmez, T
  摘要：We study manipulation of solutions by hospitals via underreporting their capacities in the context of centralized two-sided matching markets. We show that the solution that is used to match medical interns and hospitals in United States is manipulable in this way. Our main result is that there is no solution that is stable and non-manipulable ria capacities. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
• The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences AI翻译
  作者：Thomson, W
  摘要：Our objective is to investigate the implications of the ''replacement principle'' for the fair allocation of an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-peaked preferences, The principle says that when one of the components of the data entering the description of the problem to be solved changes, all of the relevant agents should be affected in the same direction: they all gain or they all lose. We apply it to situations in which the preferences of one of the agents may change, ...
• Stationary Ramsey equilibria under uncertainty AI翻译
  作者：Becker, R; Zilcha, I
  作者单位：Tel Aviv University
  摘要：Deterministic dynamic equilibrium models with borrowing constraints and heterogeneous agents exhibit stationary solutions where thr most patient household owns the economy's capital stock;. An example shows that this result does not carry over to stationary stochastic environments. Wa prove, under some conditions, the existence of a stationary rational expectations equilibrium in two related setups. The first is the existence of a stationary Nash equilibrium where each agent's payoff depends o...
• Credible proposals in communication games AI翻译
  作者：Zapater, I
  摘要：We present a nonequilibrium theory for simple communication games and use this theory to construct a new way of examining the problem of equilibrium selection in signaling and communication games. Our approach differs from the current literature in that the beliefs of the receiver after receiving an unexpected message are independent of the equilibrium payoffs. This property makes our approach immune to criticisms of conventional refinements, such as the Stiglitz critique. (C) 1997 Academic Pr...
• Harsanyi's utilitarianism theorems: General societies AI翻译
  作者：Zhou, L
  摘要：In this paper I investigate Harsanyi's utilitarianism aggregation theorems for general societies. It is proved that the social utility function is a linear (and non-negative) aggregation of individual utility functions if and only if the Pareto indifference (or the Pareto) condition holds, and that the linear aggregation has an integral representation under some regular conditions. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
• Copeland method .2. Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes AI翻译
  作者：Merlin, VR; Saari, DG
  作者单位：Northwestern University
  摘要：An important issue for economics and the decision sciences is to understand why allocation and decision procedures are plagued by manipulative and paradoxical behavior once there are n greater than or equal to 3 alternatives. Valuable insight is obtained by exploiting the relative simplicity of the widely used Copeland method (CM). By using a geometric approach, we characterize all CM manipulation, monotonicity, consistency, and involvement properties while identifying all profiles which are s...
• Incentives, CEO compensation, and shareholder wealth in a dynamic agency model AI翻译
  作者：Wang, C
  摘要：M. Jensen and K. Murphy (1990, J. Polit. Econ. 98, 225-264) argue that the observed pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation is too low to be consistent with formal agency theory. This paper uses a dynamic agency model to offer a resolution of the Jensen and Murphy puzzle. We show that the dynamic agency model can predict either a positive or a negative pay-performance sensitivity, depending on the parameter values of the model and the distribution of the CEOs' initial expected discount...