1997

最新文章

• Corporate insurance and managerial incentives AI翻译
  作者：Sung, J
  摘要：We present an agency model to examine the use of corporate insurance by publicly held firms. We assume that insurance companies serve as investigators verifying whether or not accidents were insured. When the manager performs multiple tasks to reduce the expected number of accidents, the verification results can be used to produce a pair of managerial performance measures. We show that the optimal pair of performance measures tan be obtained when the corporate insurance policy covers all uncon...
• On rationalizability in extensive games AI翻译
  作者：Battigalli, P
  摘要：This paper analyzes Pearce's notion of extensive form rationalizability (EFR). Although EFR was originally defined as a reduction procedure, this paper shows that it can be characterized in terms of restrictions on players' updating systems. These restrictions correspond to a common hierarchy of nested hypotheses. Next the relationship of EFR to more familiar reduction procedures is examined. In generic games of perfect information, EFR is realization-equivalent to iterated weak dominance and ...
• On the role of computation in economic theory AI翻译
  作者：Bona, JL; Santos, MS
  作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
  摘要：This essay is concerned with computation as a tool for the analysis of mathematical models in economics, It is our contention that the use of high-performance computers is likely to play the substantial role in providing understanding of economic models that it does with regard to models in the physical and biological sciences. The main thrust of our commentary is that numerical simulations of mathematical models are in certain respects like experiments performed in a laboratory, and that this...
• The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria AI翻译
  作者：McLennan, A
  摘要：For finite pure strategy sets S-1,...,S-n if E subset of S = S-1 x ... x S-n is the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for an open set of payoffs vectors, then #E less than or equal to #S/(max(i) #S-i). There is an open set of payoff vectors for which there are #S/(max(i) #S-i) pure Nash equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.
• Dynamic consistency and reference points AI翻译
  作者：Segal, U
  摘要：This note provides a positive answer to the following question. Is it possible to define a set of preference relations, one for each node of a decision tree, such that these preferences satisfy the reduction of compound lotteries axiom and dynamic consistency, and yet do not converge to expected utility? It is argued that updated preferences necessarily have one affine indifference curve but that other indifference curves are unrestricted. A connection is drawn to modelling ''reference points....
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations AI翻译
  作者：Forges, F; Minelli, E
  作者单位：University of Brescia
  摘要：We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria. Let E be an exchange economy with differential information. We associate a strategic market game Gamma(E) with E. We prove thai the allocations achieved through a self-fulfilling mechanism in Gamma(E) coincide with the rational expectations equilibrium allocations in E. In order to understand how self-fulfilment ...
• Diversification and equilibrium in securities markets AI翻译
  作者：Werner, J
  摘要：Diversification is the strategy of investing small fractions of wealth in each of a large number of securities and thereby reducing risk. The basic argument in support of diversification is an appeal to the Law of Large Numbers. A portfolio in which an investor's wealth is invested in equal fractions in each of N securities with i.i.d. returns, has a return that converges to a riskless return as N increases indefinitely. Any risk averse investor would prefer the limit riskless return to the re...
• Convergence in economic models with Bayesian hierarchies of beliefs AI翻译
  作者：Nyarko, Y
  摘要：I study a model where hierarchies of beliefs (the beliefs about the beliefs of other agents, etc.) are important. I provide conditions under which optimal actions of agents will converge to the Nash equilibrium of the model characterized by the tree, previously unknown ''fundamentals.'' The conditions are (i) a contraction property on the best-response mappings and (ii) a mutual absolute continuity condition on beliefs. Violation of(i) may result in an ''anything is possible'' result: any stoc...
• Fundamental nonconvexities in Arrovian markets and a Coasian solution to the problem of externalities AI翻译
  作者：Boyd, JH; Conley, JP
  作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
  摘要：D. Starrett [J. Econ. Theory 4(1972), 180-199] argues that the presence of externalities implies Fundamental nonconvexities which cause Arrow markets to fail. While this is true, we argue this failure is due to the structure of the Arrovian markets that Starrett uses, and not to the presence of externalities as such. We provide an extension of a general equilibrium public goods model in which properly rights are explicitly treated. Nonconvexities are not fundamental in this framework. We defin...
• A simple cycle preserving extension of a demand function AI翻译
  作者：John, R
  摘要：This note is a short comment on recent contributions by Peters and Wakker who extended classical examples in revealed preference theory by Gale and Shafer to the case of more than three commodities. It is shown that there is a much simpler proof of their results. (C) 1997 Academic Press.